The Owl Explains Hootenanny

This podcast covers Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), Loss-Versus-Rebalancing (LVR) and associated mitigation methods. To provide more background, MEV is the economic value that can be extracted from blockchain users through arbitrage activity. Of particular note, arbitrageurs can extract value from liquidity providers at Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs) where these losses are known as Loss-Versus-Rebalancing (LVR). After explaining both MEV and LVR, this podcast focuses on mitigation methods including expedited block times and auction mechanisms intended to extract MEV. Guest: Professor Ciamac Moallemi (Columbia University) Paper: Automated Market Making and Arbitrage Profits in the Presence of Fees 🎧 Listen on Spotify and Apple Podcasts

This podcast covers DEX Aggregators and Solvers. In more detail, DEXs are not isolated entities. Rather, a variety of "intents markets" have arisen (e.g., Uniswap X, CoW Swap) where users can express "intents" to trade and then these markets execute the intents by relying on DEX liquidity and also potentially other sources of liquidity (e.g., fillers). Intents markets are generally classified as aggregators or solvers, and this podcast explains the space of intent markets, clarifying the distinction between aggregators and solvers. The podcast particularly focuses on economic implications of intents markets. An important point is that assertions that these markets are likely to entail favorable outcomes for traders are not necessarily correct due to the underlying economic structure. Guest: Professor Mallesh Pai (Rice University) Paper: An Analysis of Intent-Based Markets 🎧 Listen on Spotify and Apple Podcasts

This podcast discusses the ability for blockchain users to attain privacy in their transactions while also remaining compliant with regulations. Of note, prominent blockchains do not provide anonymity as commonly believed; rather, forensic methods can be used to reveal the transaction behavior of users. Mixers (e.g., Tornado Cash) combat forensic methods and offer further privacy. Nonetheless, mixers have come under regulatory pressure because they can be used for illegal activities such as money laundering. This podcast explains why blockchain identities are not anonymous and the details surrounding mixers. The podcast then explains a method whereby a user employing a mixer could prove that they have not participated in money laundering, potentially achieving both privacy and regulatory compliance. Regulatory implications are discussed. Guest: Professor Fabian Schär (University of Basel) Paper: Blockchain Privacy and Regulatory Compliance 🎧 Listen on Spotify and Apple Podcasts (Recorded on Aug 16, 2024)

This podcast explains the novel risks for traders who trade at Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs) and why standard regulatory approaches are not well-suited for addressing those risks. The podcast then discusses the feasible paths for regulation weighing the relative advantages and disadvantages. An important point is that regulators are not necessarily properly aware of the challenges of regulation in the blockchain context and, as a consequence, some regulatory actions being taken might be counter-productive. Guests: Professor Campbell Harvey (Duke University) and Professor Joel Hasbrouck (NYU Stern) Paper: The Evolution of Decentralized Exchange: Risks, Benefits, and Oversight 🎧 Listen on Spotify and Apple Podcasts

This episode discusses the costs of liquidity provision at Decentralized Exchanges. Ciamac Moallemi (Columbia University) explains that liquidity providers at a Decentralized Exchange always face a loss relative to an asset portfolio that actively rebalances to match the asset weighting of the Decentralized Exchange at all times. This loss, known as Loss-Versus-Rebalancing (LVR, pronounced 'Lever'), is the primary cost of liquidity provision. Design refinements to mitigate this cost are discussed. Paper: Automated Market Making and Loss-Versus-Rebalancing

This episode discusses lending platforms on blockchains. Thomas Rivera (McGill University) and Quentin Vandeweyer (University of Chicago) explain that lending platforms generate sub-optimal welfare due to under-utilization of funds that are lent to the platform. To provide more context, lending platforms are specified in such a way that the level of borrowing (relative to lending) necessarily fluctuates with market conditions, resulting in instances where borrowing is significantly below lending. Importantly, when borrowing is significantly below lending, the total interest accrued from borrowers (relative to lending volume) is necessarily low, yielding low interest rates for lenders and thereby discouraging lending. Potential improvements for lending platforms are discussed. Paper: Equilibrium in a DeFi Lending Market

This episode discusses a phenomenon known as Just-In-Time Liquidity at Decentralized Exchanges. Agostino Capponi (Columbia University) explains that, while this phenomenon is generally viewed as positive for liquidity demanders, it can actually undermine liquidity provision. More specifically, JIT liquidity providers can pick-and-choose the best trades, which reduces the incentive for passive liquidity providers to offer liquidity. The consequent reduction in passive liquidity can lead to lower overall liquidity. Paper: The Paradox Of Just-In-Time Liquidity In Decentralized Exchanges: More Can Sometimes Mean Less

Brett Falk (University of Pennsylvania) and Gerry Tsoukalas (Boston University) discuss voting protocols in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations. Brett Falk (University of Pennsylvania) and Gerry Tsoukalas (Boston University) highlight weaknesses in existing voting protocols. An important point is that many voting protocols weight votes based on token holdings but a voter’s token holdings does not, in general, reflect the level of information that the voter has with regard to a voting proposal. The consequence of this misalignment between a voter’s weight and a voter’s information is suboptimal welfare outcomes. Paper: Token-Weighted Crowdsourcing and Balancing Power in Decentralized Governance

Lewis Cohen (DLx Law) discusses whether cryptoassets are securities from the perspective of US law. Lewis Cohen (DLx Law) explains the relevant US securities laws and then highlights how cryptoassets can differ from traditional securities. A key point is that many cryptoassets do not confer rights in the manner of traditional securities, instead conferring abilities. Cryptoassets thus might require a novel regulatory framework. Paper: The Ineluctable Modality of Securities Law